Is Hong Kong Still Autonomous? The Implications of China’s New Legislation

By Jerome A. Cohen

I recently published an “expert brief” at the request of the Council on Foreign Relations, Is Hong Kong Still Autonomous? What to Know About China’s New Laws, that discusses the Decision recently approved by the National People’s Congress. The Decision aims to prevent, stop, and punish any acts in Hong Kong that “endanger” China’s national security. In addition to criminalizing these activities, the NPC Decision authorizes national security organs to set up institutions in Hong Kong, allowing agencies such as the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Security to operate freely.

The detailed legislation of the NPC Standing Committee that will soon follow will most likely dramatically alter life in Hong Kong. I anticipate that there will be an increase in mass arrests and freedom of expression will be curbed. The “high degree of autonomy” that Deng Xiaoping promised has collapsed, damaging the business community as well as social systems and the media. In response to the new measures, President Trump has announced that the United States will take steps to revoke Hong Kong’s special trade status and other arrangements, but the details remain to be seen. There has also been a vigorous response from the United Kingdom, and the EU has expressed “grave concern.” However, we must wait to see what steps will actually be taken in the coming months.

A disturbing report about a ”national security court” in Hong Kong

By Jerome A. Cohen

Here is a disturbing report that is more than imaginative speculation. Hong Kong’s Secretary for Justice is expanding the effort of Hong Kong elite to prepare local and world public opinion to accept a new and special ”national security court” in Hong Kong as part of the forthcoming NPCSC legislation.

The CCP makes do without one in the Mainland, of course, since the Party controls all courts there. But Hong Kong’s common law system presents distinct challenges that are apparently deemed to require a distinct response. Perhaps experts informed about the secret and widely-criticized operations of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court should be asked to advise the NPCSC or, better yet, comment in public. The FISA court oversees requests from federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies for surveillance warrants to secretly monitor alleged foreign spies inside the United States.

Will the HK court operate as secretly and compliantly as the FISA court in approving electronic monitoring, search and seizure, arrest and other sanctions? And, if foreign judges are allowed to participate in such a distinctive and worrisome court, how will they be selected and in what circumstances will they function?

China, Hong Kong and June 4th

By Jerome A. Cohen

Today Hong Kong police, citing the need to enforce social-distancing rules, rejected permission for the annual June 4th vigil, for the first time in 30 years. In a governmental system where too little is transparent, one thing is transparent — the excuse for the June 4th ban is not credible. The Hong Kong Government and the Central Government plainly do not want to give Hong Kongers the opportunity to express themselves about either June 4th, 1989 or June 4th, 2020.

Will Hong Kongers be able to hold the vigil next year? A year is an eternity in politics, and predictions are hazardous. Yet, unless there is an unexpected change in leadership in Beijing, it surely seems likely, especially in light of the forthcoming legislation of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the recent NPC Decision, that Hong Kong might follow Macao in succumbing to the Amnesia that has long been forced upon the Mainland.

Such amnesia is pernicious. Mankind lives by symbols, and they often invoke the supreme sacrifice of martyrs to admired causes and revered values. Just as the Chinese Communist Party has rung the changes on the “century of humiliation” that preceded its seizure of power, we should not forget one of the greatest tragedies of what will soon be the century of humiliation that the CCP has been inflicting upon freedoms of expression and protections against arbitrary punishments for one-fifth of humanity.

Of course, it is not appropriate for an arm-chair observer far away to tell the people of Hong Kong what to do in their crisis. Yet, if it were still a free society, I would say “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom!” Being an optimist, I hope that those who choose to stay and the majority who cannot leave will, even at this stage, find a way to make an imaginative, record-breaking, totally peaceful protest against their impending fate.

I also hope that the city’s unofficial elite, who until now have been paralyzed like deer in the headlights, will finally come together with positive, concrete proposals that might begin to restore public confidence and consensus and delay or moderate the anticipated, feared legislation of the NPC Standing Committee.

The Party Central Political-Legal Affairs Commission’s comments on Hong Kong

By Jerome A. Cohen

Following the surprise public pledge of China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) to “fully direct and support Hong Kong police” to stop violence and chaos, which I commented on earlier in my blog, the Party Central Political-Legal Affairs Commission (Party PLC) announced that it’s very necessary for national security agencies to establish institutions in Hong Kong.

I was asked why the Party PLC makes a statement on Hong Kong. The Party PLC controls the MPS, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and other government security agencies. Since the MPS has announced that it will “direct” the Hong Kong police, the Party PLC will in fact be indirectly directing the Hong Kong police, if it does not already do so.

The Central Party authorities undoubtedly also influence the Hong Kong Government in other respects, not only via the Central Government Liaison Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office in Hong Kong but also through less public and official channels, including Party channels.

This influence inevitably reaches the Department of Justice and its Director of Public Prosecutions, which is where the decisions are made to prosecute alleged offenders on the basis of evidence produced by the police. This evidence will soon openly include information produced by the national security agencies, which have until now been quietly cooperating with the Hong Kong police.

This in no way formally impinges upon the independence or jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts. I have seen no evidence of Party infiltration of the Hong Kong courts or Hong Kong Government interference with the courts. Of course, there is need for further investigation and analysis of the meaning of “interference”. In every legal system, and that of Colonial Hong Kong was no exception as I know from personal experience dating from 1963, courts operate within their particular political, social and economic as well as legal contexts, and judges, individually and collectively, are not unaware of the local context or devoid of personal relationships and ambitions. In particular, it will be interesting to learn, if we can, whether MPS or MSS agents or, much more likely their intermediaries, will attempt to contact Hong Kong judges. Representatives of the security agencies are not likely to issue Hong Kong judges the “invitations to tea” so dreaded on the Mainland, but don’t rule out amiable dinners with mutual friends!  

China’s Ministry of Public Security to “fully direct and support Hong Kong police”

By Jerome A. Cohen

Here’s a statement on May 29 by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) vowing to “fully direct and support Hong Kong police” to stop violence and chaos. The timing is fascinating. At a time when some pro-Beijing elite in Hong Kong are seeking to assure the public that the establishment of national security organs in Hong Kong has minimal significance and that their offices there will only play a modest, quiet role similar to that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs office, why does the MPS make a statement that, at least in the minds of millions, will maximize anxiety about the forthcoming national security legislation by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee?

To be sure, other millions in Hong Kong may feel greater comfort at the prospect of the notoriously efficient MPS directing the Hong Kong police and thereby enhancing prospects for suppressing violence, vandalism and even peaceful mass protests, but they are not the ones raising international alarms in opposition to the forthcoming legislation.

At a time when the forthcoming legislation is being finalized, is this a move by the MPS to assert its preeminent role in controlling Hong Kong’s security, upstaging the Ministry of State Security (MSS) that the non-Mainland media often assumes will play a dominant role? The two major PRC secret police institutions often have had difficulties sorting out their respective responsibilities on the Mainland where foreign and HK elements are involved. Although generally receiving less media attention, the “guobao”, national security division, of the MPS has seemed ever present in restricting and punishing the human rights activists and lawyers I have been involved with over the years, not the MSS. But perhaps that is because the MSS usually operates more unobtrusively.

Can the people of Hong Kong gain comfort from this MPS announcement?

Thoughts on Meng Wanzhou’s extradition case and Chinese “justice”

By Jerome A. Cohen

The Canadian court has at last decided one important issue and will continue to hear others in the extradition case of Huawei’s Ms. Meng Wanzhou. The Canadian proceedings will go on for a long time. The trial court still has to consider several technical extradition questions. Then the appeal process will begin if the defense loses on those issues too, and there is also a serious issue about how long related Canadian government administrative measures will take, which will be a political football.

Despite continuing to live in the lap of Vancouver luxury, Ms. Meng ‘s business and personal life are undoubtedly significantly restricted, even though contemporary communications help to moderate these restrictions. But the real concern is that three Canadians (Michael Kovrig, Michael Spavor and Robert Lloyd Schellenberg) detained in harsh incommunicado conditions in China continue to be held as hostages to Ms. Meng’s legal fate. They must not be forgotten, especially the two who were arbitrarily detained following the commencement of the extradition proceedings. 

In passing, it is also useful to recall that the PRC, when it can, does not hesitate to resort to extradition against persons it claims have violated PRC criminal law. Many countries, however, still refuse to make extradition treaties with the PRC authorizing such proceedings because of their fear of PRC “justice”. That’s what last year’s explosive Hong Kong extradition struggle was all about. Even the Chinese citizens of the SAR were afraid to be sent to their own country’s national law enforcement. Today’s sequel struggle is occurring because the PRC is about to take its law enforcement to HK!

It’s also helpful to note that the charges against Meng Wanzhou allege types of fraud and lying. Chinese business law generally bans such misconduct, as do American law and Canadian law. Practice, of course, is another thing, which is why such misconduct is criminalized.

If we had perfect knowledge of actual practice in various countries, we might be able to determine whether there is more fraud etc practiced by PRC companies than others. This is at the root of the current USG effort to delist PRC companies from American stock exchanges because the PRC does not allow US regulators to inspect the books of PRC companies listed on American exchanges, as other countries do. No country’s companies should be permitted to trade shares in the United States unless their books are subject to inspection by the US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. This is essential to protect investors and institutional integrity.

My critique of an important pro-Beijing legal endorsement of the NPC draft Decision on Hong Kong

By Jerome A. Cohen

Here is a passionate legal endorsement of the forthcoming NPC Decision and consequent NPC Standing Committee legislation by Grenville Cross, one of the ablest pro-Beijing lawyers in Hong Kong. His orientation is that of the former government prosecutor that he was, rather than that of a defense counsel or neutral observer. CGTN, which is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, notes that the opinions of Mr. Cross do not “necessarily” reflect its own. It identifies him as a law professor but fails to state where he teaches.

As in some of his previous relevant op eds, Mr. Cross focuses on stamping out violence and threats to public order and national security but seems much less concerned about the impact that such efforts can have on freedoms of expression. For example, I know what it means to use force to “disestablish, intimidate or overthrow the central government” but I don’t know what it means to criminalize activities of a non-forceful nature that oppose the central government. What “other serious criminal means”, i.e., other than force, does he (and the central government) have in mind?

A similar question arises regarding his enthusiasm for punishing support for HK’s secession from the PRC.

Also very troublesome is his belief that “it is also necessary to criminalize organizing or supporting the activities of any organization proscribed on national security grounds, including organizations affiliated with mainland bodies which have been banned by the central government for security reasons .” This is hardly a narrow definition of “criminal activity”. It could easily punish Hong Kong people for going to a protest meeting or march sponsored by a Hong Kong human rights organization if that organization has been cooperating with a Mainland organization that has been arbitrarily banned by the PRC, which often happens.

In the eyes of Mr. Cross, “all right-thinking people now recognize” that such prosecutions would guarantee full protection and a safe future to Hong Kong’s people. He apparently only knows “right-thinking people”, not “rights-thinking people”! This Cross is too much to bear!

What should the UK do in response to China’s distortion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong?

By Jerome A. Cohen

Here’s a strong piece from Chris Patten in the Financial Times. It supports some of the suggestions that have been presented in the past few days and mentions the forthcoming G-7 meeting.

But I am disappointed that Chris does not spell out what the G-7, which I mentioned the other day in my blog, should actually do. In response to my blog, a brilliant European scholar has asked whether the G-7 might invite Taiwan to attend as an observer. Too provocative to Beijing? Too dangerous for Taiwan? After the unfair exclusion of Taiwan from the recent World Health Assembly (WHA), observer status at the G-7 would be a nice touch. Even if G-7 does not customarily invite observers, it surely can, and such an innovation would add emphasis to the importance of the invitation. 

Moreover, Patten is in a good position to urge some dramatic diplomatic responses that the UK should independently make in view of the PRC’s newest distortion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration.

Even if a UK request for bilateral discussions with Beijing to correct its distortion of the treaty is scorned, even if a UK effort to take the issues of treaty interpretation to the International Court of Justice is certain to be rejected by the PRC, these measures should be visibly attempted in order to focus world attention on what is happening.

My take on Beijing’s draft Decision on Hong Kong’s national security legislation

By Jerome A. Cohen

1. What may be driving Beijing’s draft Decision?

For the past five years, perhaps because I focus on Beijing’s domestic repression, I have inevitably accentuated the negative in appraising assessments of the PRC’s rising power. The other day I wrote that the Party’s new NPC action to authorize operation of its secret police in Hong Kong is an act of desperation. But I would not characterize it as foolhardy, as have some.

The situation in Hong Kong, from Beijing’s viewpoint, was steadily getting worse, despite the pause in protests occasioned by Covid-19. If allowed to fester without any attempt to suppress it, prospects for the autumn promised to see Hong Kong move further out of PRC control. Unless something was done, democratic politicians were likely to win the September Leg Co election. Measures taken to suspend or postpone the election or to again prevent popular candidates from seeking election or taking office would be sure to inspire huge crowds to reenter the streets if, as appears likely, the virus no longer inhibits public protests by then. Even if pro-Beijing politicians won the election and continued to control Leg Co, they could not be counted on to enact Article 23 legislation, as long experience has demonstrated. Bold central action now, while fear of the virus keeps people at home, might well be the least unfavorable option open to the leadership.

What Beijing has done is to reverse last summer’s humiliating defeat over its failure to have Hong Kong enact extradition/rendition measures that would have transferred some people in Hong Kong to the Mainland’s system of arbitrary detention and criminal injustice. It has done so by taking the Mainland’s system of arbitrary detention and criminal injustice to all of Hong Kong! Article 4 of the draft NPC Decision promises the establishment in Hong Kong by “relevant national security organs” of “agencies” that will improve “enforcement mechanisms” to guarantee national security in terms that the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of National Security have made well-known throughout the rest of China. The “final solution”, to invoke a sinister Hitlerian term, is the acceleration of Hong Kong’s transformation into “another Chinese city” long before 2047. This is already proving to be a costly gamble for Beijing, but nothing ventured, nothing gained!

2.  What do we know about the process regarding the draft Decision?

Some interesting relevant tidbits have emerged in recent hours. Apparently the law or laws that the Standing Committee is responsible for drafting in accordance with the not yet approved Decision are well under way.

But has the Basic Law Committee that was established to advise the Standing Committee already been consulted about the text? Prof. Albert Chen of Hong Kong University Law School, a brilliant scholar who has been a member of the Basic Law Committee since its inception, has been quoted in the press as predicting that the anticipated legislation will have broader scope than Article 23 and has appropriately cautioned against the danger that the text may easily be expanded to suppress “political opponents, dissidents, media, educators, intellectuals and so on”. The draft Decision reportedly came as a surprise to him, and I have seen no indication that the Basic Law Committee has yet been convened.

Various pro-Beijing Hong Kong political figures have recently spoken out with ostensible knowledge of the contemplated legislation, but with widely varying predictions of what offenses it will cover. Yet, like the Politburo leader responsible for Hong Kong affairs, they offer assurances that the contemplated legislation will be surgically applied to affect only its supposedly circumscribed targets, allegedly only a small group.

3.  What are the legal and human rights implications?

Here’s an excellent analysis from the NPC Observer of the Draft NPC Decision on Hong Kong. It highlights the serious legal challenges that the draft Decision presents to a conventional interpretation of the Basic Law and also the anticipated rationalizations for overcoming them, at least to the satisfaction of pro-Beijing advocates. In the end, it concludes, as I did in a brief earlier blog, that, given the structure of the PRC constitutional/legal system and the provisions of the Basic Law, the NPC Standing Committee has the power to say that the law is whatever it wishes it to be. So much for the protections supposedly guaranteed by PRC domestic law, including its reign over Hong Kong!

This does not relieve the central government and the Party of charges that the Decision and the legislation will violate the PRC’s obligations under the 1984 UK-PRC Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, including its pledge that Hong Kong will continue to be protected by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) until the Joint Declaration expires in 2047. Nor does it free Beijing from charges that the Decision and legislation may result in violations of the PRC’s broader international human rights obligations.

Apparently to provide assurance that the agents of the Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Public Security who will now be authorized to openly operate in Hong Kong will not run amok and usurp the role of the Hong Kong police, it has been suggested that the Hong Kong government may revive the Special Branch unit of the local police that was abolished before the 1997 Handover by the UK to the PRC. The vague language of the draft Decision foreshadows this.

Knowledgeable observers will take such assurances for what they are worth.

4.  What is to be done?

What is to be done in response to Beijing’s sudden mortal wound to Hong Kong’s promised “high degree of autonomy”? People should read this excellent statement by Human Rights in China and its very able executive director, my NYU Law School colleague Professor Sharon Hom. It provides the best answer to date. This should stimulate further creative thinking. For example, an effort could be made to cancel or at least postpone the 2020 Olympics in China.

Saturday’s Washington Post editorial suggests that selective resort to certain U.S. sanctions made available by existing American legislation would seem desirable and that the sanctions that would be authorized by a new proposal to be considered by the Senate would add to the possibilities without invoking the nuclear option of entirely eliminating Hong Kong’s special trade and investment status. As the Magnitsky Act experience shows, however, such sanctions are never invoked against the one PRC official we all know should be the target — the great dictator.

But political and diplomatic measures can be taken at the G-7 and other major forums. Despite the PRC’s veto in the Security Council, even U.N. meetings and those of other international institutions can become occasions for multilateral, not merely unilateral, denunciations. 

Surely, Hong Kong’s protection under the ICCPR should be brought into play. But all this requires effective allied cooperation and, above all, vigorous activism on the part of the UK, which is the treaty partner whose expectations are being violated by the PRC.  

Beijing’s agenda to enact national security legislation governing Hong Kong: some initial thoughts

By Jerome A. Cohen

Obviously the current plan to enact national security legislation governing Hong Kong is not Beijing’s preferred way but is a mark of desperation. If it had been attempted much earlier in the post-’97 period, especially before the Article 23 fiasco in Hong Kong in 2003, it might have passed legal muster without creating as much consternation as it does now.

At this time, however, coming in the wake of the failures to enact relevant security legislation via Article 23 and the inability of LegCo to do so in the future on its own, Beijing’s current move certainly looks like a clever trick that inevitably inspires even greater popular distrust than ever in the NPC Standing Committee’s interpretations of the Basic Law.

The NPC Standing Committee will undoubtedly prevail in technical PRC legal terms, given the wording and structure of the Basic Law, the provisions for its interpretation and the way those provisions have been applied in recent years. But the political costs to the Central Government and the people of Hong Kong will be very high.

This will not be the formal end of “One Country Two Systems,” but it is surely a mortal wound to the living, meaningful system that many had been misled into hoping for. The people of Hong Kong should prepare to cope with the varieties of arbitrary detention that have been inflicted on compatriots elsewhere in China who have tried to exercise freedoms of expression. The Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of National Security will no longer have to operate secretly in the SAR. Both will soon have agencies formally and openly established there. Their promised “enforcement mechanisms” can be relied upon to eliminate dissent in Hong Kong almost as efficiently as they have done on the Mainland.

There are many ways that the United States, the UK and other democratic countries can strongly react to Beijing’s latest legal legerdemain. Perhaps Washington will invoke some aspects of existing federal legislation relating to Hong Kong, but I hope it does not act in ways that will penalize Hong Kong’s already long-suffering people rather than the regime that increasingly dictates to them.

US policy toward the PRC: "the 4 Cs” — cooperation, competition, criticism and containment

By Jerome A. Cohen

Here is a stimulating piece by Steve Orlins, president of the National Committee on US-China Relations for so many years, stressing the importance of Sino-American cooperation in combatting Covid-19. Among other things, Steve discusses the difference between healthy competition and strategic competition.

In a recent Zoom talk, I tried to come up with a catchy slogan summarizing the elements of a balanced US policy toward the PRC.  I called it “the 4 Cs” — cooperation, competition, criticism and containment.

Each of these concepts requires refinement and continuous adjustment. At this time, I’d like to see more discussion, for example, of the differences between desirable containment and dangerous containment.

Also, the scope and emphasis to be given to criticism is an almost daily dilemma for me personally because of requests to comment on this or that PRC policy or action infringing on international political and civil rights as well as rights mentioned in the PRC Constitution. Every criticism provides more ammunition to those who advocate decoupling from the PRC and frustrating its development, policies that I oppose.

Yet self-censorship would be unacceptable and constitute abandonment of hope for moderating the excesses of Beijing’s dictatorship through international exposure and pressures. It would also represent a failure to honor the moral obligation to speak on behalf of the many Chinese who are not allowed to speak of human rights abuses in their country.

My take on the Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen's second inaugural speech

By Jerome A. Cohen

President Tsai Ing-wen’s inaugural speech yesterday was a solid, substantive, serious and comprehensive overview, frank without being provocative, and open to improvement in cross-strait relations without appearing undignified or intimidated. What a vivid contrast to Trump’s nauseating flights of self-congratulations.

Although there was a quick reference to common destiny in her speech, it was domestic in focus, and President Tsai refrained from unrealistic dreaming, Xi Jinping-style, even while charting an inspiring, realistic course.

A few points seem worth noting. She never fully explained her statement that “Cross-strait relations have reached a historical turning point.” To me, they always seem to be. And there was the interesting reference to “the leader on the other side of the Strait” rather than the Party General Secretary or the PRC President or Mr. Xi Jinping.

Most worrisome perhaps to Beijing will be the establishment of a constitutional amendment committee in the Legislature, Although the only specific constitutional reform mentioned relates to lowering the voting age and is not controversial, she left the door open to some possible greater assertion of Taiwan’s independent status, thus throwing a tacit bone to the Taiwan independence wing of the DPP.

While recognizing the need for further judicial reform and mentioning the unresolved struggle over what kind of lay judge system should finally be chosen to enlarge popular participation, Ms. Tsai refrained from specific reforms of governmental institutions except with respect to establishment of the long-awaited National Human Rights Commission. Whether keeping it “under the Control Yuan”, the nominally independent branch of government responsible for scrutinizing the other branches, will allow sufficient protection of political and civil rights remains to be seen.

Finally, I did not note any mention of Hong Kong’s monumental, losing struggle for its promised “high degree of autonomy”. That might have been deemed too provocative.

The speech contained no word of thanks to the departing vice president, the distinguished epidemiologist who has garnered such a good press during the Covid-19 crisis, but that reportedly was accomplished in an earlier, less-publicized ceremony.

Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the World Health Organization would implement, not violate, UN principles

—WHO and governments around the world would benefit from this principled reform.—

By Jerome A. Cohen and Yu-Jie Chen

When SARS traumatized Asia in 2003, Taiwan was the world’s third hardest-hit place after China and Hong Kong. Yet China prevented Taiwan from receiving much-needed assistance from the World Health Organization (WHO). Seventeen years later, as the Covid-19 pandemic rages elsewhere, Taiwan has achieved a remarkable success in containing this virus without imposing any lockdown. Yet Beijing still insists upon Taiwan’s exclusion from WHO, barring the world’s health agency from engaging with Taiwan’s best practices.

On May 18, when WHO’s decision-making body, the World Health Assembly (WHA), opens its 73rd session, its 194 member states have another opportunity to correct this injustice. Will they continue to turn a blind eye to Taiwan’s importance, making a mockery of WHO’s mission to promote “health for all”?

Despite its widely-condemned mishandling of the outbreak of Covid-19, China fiercely objects to even renewal of Taiwan’s former status as a mere observer in the WHA. Beijing has again mobilized the support of a large bloc of authoritarian governments and developing countries that depend on its favor. They are likely to outvote the number of countries that the United States and its allies are urging to back Taiwan’s limited participation in the WHO.

To justify the decision to exclude the 23 million people in Taiwan, WHO, as well as many member states, continues to rely on an erroneous legal argument that Beijing has widely propagated. Last week, for example, when asked about Taiwan’s participation, WHO’s principal legal officer Steven Solomon invoked the 1971 U.N. General Assembly resolution 2758 as well as the WHA resolution 25.1, which reiterated the General Assembly resolution. He stated that “Forty-nine years ago the United Nations and WHO decided that there was only one legitimate representative of China within the UN system, and that is the PRC.”

Citing General Assembly resolution 2758 to deny Taiwan’s international participation is misguided. When U.N. member states adopted the resolution in 1971, they only voted on one issue: which government should sit in China’s seat in the United Nations? Should it be the Republic of China (ROC) government on Taiwan or the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government on the mainland? The resolution “recognize[d] that the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations.”

Contrary to Beijing’s propaganda, the resolution did not go beyond that. Indeed, so long as the Taiwan government does not claim China’s U.N. seat, the resolution does not prevent Taiwan’s eventual membership as an independent state in the United Nations and any of its affiliated organizations such as WHO. The United Nations is legally free to recognize that Taiwan has all the characteristics of statehood, as it does, and admit it as a new member, even one called the Republic of China on Taiwan. Surely, there is no barrier to WHO’s grant of mere observer status to Taiwan today.

In fact, every year from 2009 to 2016, China allowed WHO’s Director General to issue an invitation to Taiwan to take part in the WHA as an observer. Neither WHO nor the Chinese government then claimed Taiwan’s observer status to be a violation of any U.N. principles or international law. Beijing accepted it because of Beijing’s political rapprochement with the Taiwan government then dominated by the Nationalist Party.

Unfortunately, that observer status was not translated into the “meaningful participation” sought by Taiwan. Taiwan was not allowed to take part in the majority of WHO’s technical meetings, in which important information and solutions were exchanged. The status also proved vulnerable. Since the people in Taiwan in 2016 elected as president Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party, which Beijing disfavors, Taiwan has not been invited back to the WHA. This is naked politics masquerading as U.N. law.

To be sure, at this stage of international politics, for WHO purposes flexibility is still needed in tweaking Taiwan’s formal name to avoid Beijing’s hyper-sensitivity to any hint that Taiwan may have achieved independence from China. When Taiwan previously served as observer in WHA it was under the name of “Chinese Taipei”, which can be repeated.

There are significant precedents in which major public international organizations outside the U.N. system have included Taiwan because it is too important to be left out of global governance. As early as 1986, for example, after the PRC joined the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Taiwan was able to stay in the organization due to its fast growing economy and strong economic ties with other countries, although it had to accept the change in title designated by the ADB as “Taipei, China.” In 1991, Taiwan became a full member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) under the name of “Chinese Taipei” at the same time China joined the group. Moreover, the World Trade Organization (WTO), which China entered in 2001, admitted Taiwan the following year under the name “Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei)." The WTO welcomed Taiwan because the world community realized that the WTO would not be effective or legitimate if it excluded one of the world’s important trading countries.

When it comes to the world’s public health, Taiwan’s role is no less important, especially given its proximity to China, which makes it susceptible to infectious diseases originating from the mainland. Taiwan also offers outstanding health expertise, significant resources and best practices. It is now donating medical masks, developing testing kits and vaccines, and partnering with several countries to exchange solutions about Covid-19. Including Taiwan in WHO’s efforts to fight the coronavirus, if only as observer, will add greatly to these efforts. This is plainly in the self-interest of governments hard hit by the pandemic, regardless of their ties to China. Taiwan’s observer status would not violate any U.N. principles or international law. It would instead begin reforms urgently needed to repair WHO’s damaged credibility and efficacy.

Jerome A. Cohen, adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is professor of law at New York University and founding director of its US-Asia Law Institute. Yu-Jie Chen, a Taiwan lawyer, is a global academic fellow at Hong Kong University’s Faculty of Law and an affiliated scholar at the US-Asia Law Institute.

Diplomatic interpreters and direct communication

By Jerome A. Cohen

A few days ago NYT had an obituary for Ji Chaozhu, who by all accounts was always a wonderful interpreter. His efforts in the early 1970s were supplemented by Nancy Tang (Tang Wenshun), who shared a similar Sino-American upbringing. Because I was on leave from teaching at Harvard Law, I think Ji felt a certain connection with me, close enough to call one winter day in Beijing in 1979 to ask whether I could arrange for an interpreter from the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be admitted to the regular three-year American law JD program at Harvard Law School. MOFA, he said, wanted to have its first well-trained expert in American law to promote the recent normalization of diplomatic relations.

In view of China’s then extreme foreign exchange shortage, he also asked me to find the funds to pay any necessary costs! The interpreter-candidate he sent for an interview, a dynamic woman in her late 30s, proved as able as Ji predicted, and she was soon admitted without the usual tests etc. Finding the funds beyond a scholarship proved a bit more challenging. But Alexis Coudert, senior partner of the late lamented Coudert Brothers international law firm, for which I was consulting, gave an imaginative interpretation to the terms of a foundation grant he was administering for the study of Polish law that provided enough support to sustain her til graduation!

I don’t think, however, that Ji or any foreign interpreter should have been permitted by the US Government to serve both sides in formal diplomatic discussions. As I recall, the USG did not make use of Foreign Service Officer Chas Freeman, a superb interpreter (and Harvard Law School JD) whom the State Department had trained for the normalization process, for Nixon’s most important discussions in Beijing in 1972. Since Kissinger did not want Secretary of State Bill Rogers there, how could he have the Secretary’s young assistant?  

Finally, I cannot emphasize enough the importance of direct communication without the intervention of an interpreter. At a recent University of Virginia Zoom conference, US Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottniger’s delivery of his speech in Mandarin—which has been widely-watched and discussed by many in China—was a master stroke, one that I hope will encourage US diplomats stationed abroad to speak more often in the local language rather than through an interpreter.

I much admired my Harvard colleague and friend, the late Edwin O. Reischauer, who served five years as US ambassador to Japan 1961-66 and was worshipped by Japanese scholars and the Japanese public for his expertise on the country and its language. Yet he usually called upon Prof. Otis Cary, whom I later knew when visiting at Doshisha University, to interpret for him on formal public occasions while serving as ambassador. He believed that any error he might commit in speaking Japanese in public would diminish his status in the eyes of his audience. As I mentioned to him, I think greater weight should be put on the value of American representatives speaking directly in the local language to the foreign public they are addressing.

Matt Pottinger’s speech on the May 4th Movement: tradition, modernity and contemporary liberal aspirations

By Jerome A. Cohen

I am grateful to Matt Pottinger for making this speech (English; Mandarin), which has been widely-circulated, especially because of the stimulating discussion it has provoked in public as well as among China scholars. I thought it was a brilliant political speech, beautifully crafted for the audiences to which it was directed in the US, the West and China. It was not intended as an academic discourse.

Matt’s speech has provoked the expression once again of different views among China scholars about how to interpret the May 4th Movement. Like preceding chapters of Chinese history, it was capacious enough to permit both scholars and political figures to find in it what they might be looking for.

I am reminded of Stephen Platt’s excellent review, in last Saturday’s weekend Wall Street Journal, of a new book by Timothy Brook entitled Great State: China and the World. Platt’s last paragraph, arguing that “China is no more constrained by its history than any other country”, concludes that “insofar as its leaders prefer to cast their efforts as a culmination of what has gone before, Mr. Brook shows us that there are ready examples to justify nearly any path they choose.”

For example, late Qing dynasty reformers like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao found support for their proposals in pre-20th century Chinese history. I recall that in the 1970s Ross Terrill edited a volume, The China Difference, for which he asked John Fairbank to consider the extent to which China’s history might provide support for greater freedoms of expression. Ross asked me to look into sources of possible support for ideas of government under law and due process. I don’t think John found too much to build on. Perhaps reflecting the greater optimism of youth, I think I found some traditional theories and practices that might be mobilized on behalf of contemporary liberal aspirations (My article then is here: “Due Process [in China]?” in Ross Terrill (ed.). The China Difference. New York : Harper & Row. 1979.).

To me the remarkable thing about our desirable efforts to scrutinize the May 4th process is how relatively little attention has been focused on its significance for the growth of a modern legal system. Yet Democracy, Science and the freedoms of expression on which they rest are unlikely to flourish in the absence of the rule of law, however its many variant meanings are conventionally understood. I doubt that I will undertake such a study. Perhaps colleagues can tell us that some good ones exist already, in Chinese if not in English, if we return to works published in the era between the two great wars that I am unfamiliar with. In any event I hope that the present ferment will reach the legal system as well as other crucial topics caught up in the wake of May 4th.

90th birthday of Prof. CHEN Guangzhong, "Godfather" of China's post-Cultural Revolution criminal procedure reforms

By Jerome A. Cohen

Professor Chen Guangzhong (陈光中), emeritus professor at the Chinese University of Politics and Law (CUPL), is the “grand old man” of China’s criminal justice legislation. He played a prominent role in the drafting of the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), the first in the PRC’s history.

In the mid-1950s, under deStalinized Soviet influence, drafts had been formulated but, because of the 1957-58 Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Sino-Soviet split, the Cultural Revolution and other political factors, the draft legislation was not enacted. After Mao’s death the drafting process was renewed, still influenced largely but not nominally by Soviet law, and legal scholars like Prof. Chen, who had been sidelined for two decades, began to play an important role.

(Prof. CHEN Guangzhong (2000); photo source)

(Prof. CHEN Guangzhong (2000); photo source)

By the time of the major 1996 CPL revisions, Prof. Chen was the leading figure shaping the revisions in a quiet struggle with Party, police and other officials who opposed many Western-style due process reforms. Chen, who briefly served as the President of CUPL and was the Inaugural President of the China CPL Society, trained most of the PRC’s many experts on criminal justice who have valiantly served with distinction as well as frustration not only in academe but also in government, the judiciary and the legal profession. He edited an important book in the late ‘90s about the problems confronting PRC adherence to and compliance with the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR), which the PRC signed over two decades ago but has still not ratified. Although retired, Prof. Chen retains considerable prestige in academic and legal circles that have fallen on hard times. He amply warrants our admiration and congratulations!

The graduating class in the first one-year training program in law that any foreigners have ever offered in the PRC

By Jerome A. Cohen

I’m now in the process of collecting old photos for the purpose of my memoirs as well as a Chinese-language festschrift that my colleagues have been working on for my 90th birthday on July 1!

Here is a photo of the graduating class in the first one-year training program in law that any foreigners have ever offered in the PRC. Steve OrlinsOwen Nee and I ran it — in the Chinese language — as guests of the Beijing Economic Development Corporation (BEDC, the alter ego of the Beijing Economic Commission) whose leader, the marvelous XIAO Yang (肖秧), later became Party Secretary of Chongqing and then Governor of Sichuan Province.

1980 graduating class in the first one-year training program in law that any foreigners have ever offered in the PRC.jpg

The 30 or so city business officials who took part had never studied law before, needed legal education in their daily work and were released from their law-related jobs fulltime in order to give their all to our course. A few went on to study law in the US at Harvard, Berkeley and other places and later worked in Chinese and American law firms. Xiao, who became my best PRC friend, later made me formal advisor to Sichuan for purposes of attracting foreign investment. 

China’s regular law schools were just reopening and did not yet welcome foreigners. We gave this nine hour per week course again for BEDC the following year, since our efforts were highly appreciated.

You will also see some unauthorized foreign auditors in the photo including my wife Joan and our three hirsute sons!

Invisible punishment of countless people in China

By Jerome A. Cohen

Human Rights Watch’s Sophie Richardson just wrote an article, Chinese Authorities Torment Activist’s Dying Mother. It’s a representative example of the kinds of informal but harsh punishments to which countless people are invisibly subjected in China, without a shred of legal pretense. One can only speculate about the numbers of victims of this lawlessness, usually inflicted by the secret police or their thugs.

When the PRC National People’s Congress meets in a few weeks, in their annual reports the President of the Supreme People’s Court and the Procurator General will each rattle off endless statistics about the millions of cases their respective institutions have formally processed. Yet no one will report on the millions of people who suffer daily humiliating, unregulated restrictions on their personal freedoms. The Ministry of Public Security should certainly report on this important aspect of its massive activity, but it also does nor report on its monitoring and inhibition of even the Party elite, not to mention ordinary citizens. At least this massive task provides jobs for many university graduates who might otherwise face employment problems!

My interview with ThinkTech Hawaii

This was an informal interview done at the request of Hawaii Public Radio, which wanted to discuss the extent to which I agree with those who now claim that our engagement policy with the People’s Republic of China was a terrible mistake (interview youtube link).

I think the interviewer, the knowledgeable observer Jay Fidell who had interviewed me years ago, had read my recent memoir essay, “Was Helping China Build Its Post-1978 Legal System a Mistake?”. The program was meant to be on Zoom but technical difficulties turned it into a telephone talk.

My take on The Harvard Crimson’s “The End of the Harvard Century” and The Yale Daily News’s “No Lux or Veritas”

By Jerome A. Cohen

People have been talking about this Harvard Crimson piece, “The End of the Harvard Century”. It is indeed interesting and offers many stimulating insights into a much bigger story. The reporter is impressive for an undergraduate. 

Unfortunately, he fails to mentions the long and mutually beneficial involvement of Harvard Law School with the PRC going back to late 1978 when the PRC State Tax Bureau, after 25 years of deliberation, suddenly decided that it wanted to send young officials to Harvard’s International Tax Program. Professor Bill Alford, who was criticized in the Crimson article, has done a superb job of promoting HLS legal cooperation with China for the past thirty years.

The irony in the Crimson story’s misleading reference to Bill’s role is that Teng Biao would never have had the opportunity for a year at Harvard if Bill had not immediately welcomed him upon learning that Teng wanted to spend the year at the Law School! That’s why Teng didn’t want to mention Bill’s name to the Crimson reporter. The pressure to cancel the meeting obviously came from higher Harvard authorities who have occasionally had difficulty applying the admonition of Chairman Mao to “walk on two legs”, fostering necessary and desirable cooperation with the PRC, despite or because of its Communist oppression, while at the same time allowing full campus freedom to protest that oppression and even supporting such protests in appropriate circumstances, as President Bacow did in Beijing. Not an easy challenge for any of us in the China field who seek cooperation and exchange with a great people who constitute over 20% of the world’s population.

An earlier Yale Daily News story about Yale’s complex relations with the PRC is also worth reading side by side with the Harvard Crimson story. Again, this is a very impressive piece of undergraduate journalism that gives us much to ponder. And again, there is much more to this important story yet to be told, including a fuller version of the fascinating tale of the father and son, Paul and Joseph Tsai, and their connections to Yale and to China/Taiwan. Paul Tsai, a Yale Law contemporary of mine and a very bright Taiwan lawyer from a leading Shanghai legal family, was a bitter ant-Communist who tried to discourage me from studying the Mainland in the 1960s. Joseph, an equally bright graduate of both Yale College and Law School, decided not to join the family law practice in Taipei but to cooperate with Jack Ma in building Alibaba and thus became phenomenally wealthy, a great Yale benefactor and a strong supporter of the PRC. 

I wish the author of the Yale Daily News report, having ably pointed out the credit that Yale’s then President Levin had given himself for bringing Yale as an institution (as distinguished from its many individual and departmental efforts) into cooperation with the PRC, had thrown this back at his successor President Salovey’s administration’s attempts to defend itself against its failure to criticize the PRC’s human rights atrocities by claiming that Yale as an institution always remains neutral. In comparison, Harvard’s President Bacow did better when visiting China. As a colleague pointed out, back in the old days, Yale University “was quick to condemn the country's apartheid regime”—“Neutrality” does not appear to be a justifiable defense, given that precedent as well as moral principles.