My take on the Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen's second inaugural speech

By Jerome A. Cohen

President Tsai Ing-wen’s inaugural speech yesterday was a solid, substantive, serious and comprehensive overview, frank without being provocative, and open to improvement in cross-strait relations without appearing undignified or intimidated. What a vivid contrast to Trump’s nauseating flights of self-congratulations.

Although there was a quick reference to common destiny in her speech, it was domestic in focus, and President Tsai refrained from unrealistic dreaming, Xi Jinping-style, even while charting an inspiring, realistic course.

A few points seem worth noting. She never fully explained her statement that “Cross-strait relations have reached a historical turning point.” To me, they always seem to be. And there was the interesting reference to “the leader on the other side of the Strait” rather than the Party General Secretary or the PRC President or Mr. Xi Jinping.

Most worrisome perhaps to Beijing will be the establishment of a constitutional amendment committee in the Legislature, Although the only specific constitutional reform mentioned relates to lowering the voting age and is not controversial, she left the door open to some possible greater assertion of Taiwan’s independent status, thus throwing a tacit bone to the Taiwan independence wing of the DPP.

While recognizing the need for further judicial reform and mentioning the unresolved struggle over what kind of lay judge system should finally be chosen to enlarge popular participation, Ms. Tsai refrained from specific reforms of governmental institutions except with respect to establishment of the long-awaited National Human Rights Commission. Whether keeping it “under the Control Yuan”, the nominally independent branch of government responsible for scrutinizing the other branches, will allow sufficient protection of political and civil rights remains to be seen.

Finally, I did not note any mention of Hong Kong’s monumental, losing struggle for its promised “high degree of autonomy”. That might have been deemed too provocative.

The speech contained no word of thanks to the departing vice president, the distinguished epidemiologist who has garnered such a good press during the Covid-19 crisis, but that reportedly was accomplished in an earlier, less-publicized ceremony.

Taiwan’s loss of one more diplomatic ally to China: my thoughts on how Taiwan can strengthen its ties with the outside world

By Jerome A. Cohen

Solomon Islands has shifted recognition from Taiwan to China. At a time when the PRC is aggressively luring away Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, Taiwan more than ever needs the support of the U.S. Government and non-governmental institutions as well as other countries. Much more can be done, starting with a U.S. Presidential speech that recognizes not the R.O.C. government but the achievements that the people of Taiwan have made toward the rule of law, democracy and protection of human rights in cooperation with the many governments that have continued to foster cooperation with the island in the absence of formal diplomatic relations.

Some observers have also suggested that U.S. arm sales to Taiwan should be boosted but I would not unduly emphasize further arms sales, which are reportedly under way and which in any event feature the sale of high prestige weapons that are not well adapted to Taiwan’s actual defense needs.

Some have also proposed that an invitation should be extended to President Tsai to speak at a Washington think tank on the same program as a prominent U.S. official. I don’t know whether the current U.S. Government can either arrange for her to have an exceptional “stopover” in DC or to lift the obnoxious ban against having Taiwan’s president visit any American city on a normal basis. I have suggested that Tsai speak, either in person or via Skype, at the Council on Foreign Relations in NY both before and after she ascended to the presidency but she has never given a positive response. But I have never tried the idea of a companion presentation from a leading American foreign policy official. That idea is worth pursuing both in DC and elsewhere in the United States and in a way that could not be seen to imply official U.S. Government “recognition”. On several occasions the Council on Foreign Relations has used electronic means to interview Taiwan’s leaders, including President Chen Shui-bian and President Ma Ying-jeou as well as Vice President Annette Lu.

Any restriction on the appearance of Taiwan leaders in person before American think tank or other audiences is a restriction on Americans’ freedoms of expression and assembly that seems unwise from the viewpoint of American constitutionalism as well as foreign policy.

Finally, Xi Jinping has talked about the PRC developing a new model of diplomatic relations. Actually, the PRC has inadvertently begun to do so by denying Taiwan the possibility of formal diplomatic relations, thus requiring it and the major powers of the liberal world to interact and cooperate on a new basis. This process is already underway and should be built upon, as the U.S. Government has recently been doing. Many bilateral actions can be taken relatively easily, if discreetly. Much more difficult will be the process of integrating unrecognized Taiwan into multilateral organizations that limit full participation to recognized “states”. But much greater efforts must be made to do so by the democratic powers.

“The 1992 Consensus”: One Formula, Too Many Interpretations

By Jerome A. Cohen

Here is a sobering essay, Taiwan’s wooing of Asean is pointless. It should just accept China and the 1992 consensus again, by a Taiwan scholar who seems to assume that Beijing will be satisfied if Tsai returns to Ma Ying-jeou’s understanding of “One China”, with “differing interpretations”, instead of acquiescing in Beijing’s version of “One China,” which does not recognize Taiwan’s “differing interpretations.” He also doesn’t evaluate the domestic Taiwan forces that block Tsai from even accepting Ma’s view, apparently seeking to persuade Deep Green supporters of the hopelessness of their position.

For an analysis of the “1992 Consensus,” this article I’ve just published with Yu-Jie Chen on China-Taiwan Relations Re-Examined: The '1992 Consensus' and Cross-Strait Agreements would be of interest. We point out that there was never a genuine consensus. The Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party have different understandings of what the “1992 Consensus” means. In the Kuomintang’s view, it means “One China, Respective Interpretations” (Yige Zhongguo Gezi Biaoshu 一個中國，各自表述, OCRI). This formulation at best can be understood as a formula to implicitly agree that there is only “one China” and that Taiwan is part of that “China” but to disagree about which government is the legitimate, exclusive representative of that “China.” In the interpretation of the KMT’s ROC Government, “one China” of course means the ROC, not the PRC.

Yet, in Beijing’s current narrative, the “1992 Consensus” embodies its own “One China Principle,” which emphasizes the PRC as the only legitimate government that represents the whole of China, including Taiwan, without acknowledging that the Taiwan side may have a different interpretation. In the PRC’s view, the phrase “respective interpretations” in the OCRI formula should not exist. How’s that for a supposed “consensus”?

China-Taiwan Relations Re-examined: The '1992 Consensus' and Cross-strait Agreements

By Jerome A. Cohen

Given the recent dueling speeches of Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen, readers might be interested in my forthcoming article co-authored with Yu-Jie Chen on the “1992 Consensus” and cross-strait agreements (Our assessment of the “1992 Consensus” can be found in Section I).

This article was completed in December 2018, but the New Year speeches of Xi and Tsai only vindicate our analysis about the divergent views of the “1992 Consensus.” Their speeches, together with the response from the Kuomintang (KMT) rejecting Xi’s proposal of “One Country, Two Systems,” make it ever clearer that there was no genuine “consensus” about sovereignty issues disputed by the PRC and ROC governments. Notably, Xi Jinping’s remarks, linking “One Country, Two System” with the “1992 Consensus,” depart from China’s previous implicit practice not to publicly challenge the KMT’s position of “One China, Respective Interpretations.”

Donald Trump's telephone call with Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen

China plainly cannot be happy with this direct telephone contact between Taiwan’s President Tsai and President-elect Trump. Of course, Trump is not yet president, so the contact can be regarded as unofficial. Yet it suggests the possibility that the Trump administration may to some extent alter the long-standing policy of the U.S. Government of not maintaining official contact with the Taiwan government.

Photo credit: Reuters, ABC News

Pressures have been building during the Obama era to abandon the strict US policy of not permitting the president and vice president of Taiwan to do more than transit the U.S. Indeed, I have advocated allowing them free access to every place in America except Washington, D.C., especially since the current rule restricts my freedoms of speech, information and association unnecessarily and undesirably. A similar rule has prevented the highest American officials from visiting Taiwan, again an inappropriate restriction, especially when the security of Taiwan will soon become a major issue in Sino-American relations once again.

Of course, administrations often change course in light of events. In April 2001 I recall watching George W. Bush, as part of what appeared to be a pugnacious stance toward China, declare on TV at the outset of his administration that he would do ”whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan. Once 9/11 occurred, his administration moved much closer to the People’s Republic and began to avoid provocative statements.