New Regulations on Discipline from CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection

By Jerome A. Cohen

The new regulations on discipline from the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection are fascinating and worthy of serious research. How are targets of discipline selected? Is the clause on prohibited reading merely used as an add-on in cases where other charges are brought or is it sometimes applied independently? What procedures apply and how is evidence introduced and evaluated? What Communist Party and administrative sanctions are applied in what circumstances? To what extent does the CCDI system send cases to the courts for criminal punishments? To what extent does the CCDI system influence the handling of such criminal cases by the police, the procuracy and the courts?

I believe that, under the awning of the National Supervisory Commission, certain non-Party members are also subject to these strictures if they are government officials of one kind or other. Is there anyone out there who knows and is free to tell us? It must be a matter of considerable interest to the millions who are subject to this discipline. 

The New Amendments to the PRC's Counter-Espionage Law

The first thing to keep in mind about the amendments to the counter-espionage law – and any law in the PRC – is that the secret police are free to ignore it when they deem it desirable to do so. Despite their actions cloaked in secrecy, many cases of lawless action eventually become known to the public and to foreigners, as recent cases again illustrate.

It is encouraging to see that the forthcoming law will be amended to protect “individuals”, i.e., including foreigners, rather than only “citizens”. But no one should be foolish enough to rely on the paper protections of human rights in this legislation or the PRC’s other provisions relating to criminal justice.

Second, speculation about how the vague terms in the amended law will actually be interpreted and applied should await promulgation of a new set of Detailed Implementing Rules as well as regional and local regulations.

Third, it is unclear which of the relevant legal institutions will exercise the most power over enforcement of the law. Surely it will not be the courts. Will it be the local Communist Party Political-Legal Committee? The organs of the Ministry of State Security? Or the recently-established National Supervisory Commission and its agents? And how meaningful is it to state that espionage cases are subject to law when the Criminal Procedure Law allows criminal investigators to detain a suspect incommunicado for six months before a decision is made to initiate conventional criminal procedures and when in espionage cases those procedures are applied in blatant denial of basic due process rights?

The anticipated amendments to the espionage law add to the already breathtaking breadth of its provisions. Acts of espionage will now include “seeking to align with an espionage organization and its agents”. The new law will protect not only state secrets and intelligence but all “other documents, data, statistics, materials and other items related to national security”. And officials are admonished, of course, to take “a holistic view of national security” in applying the terms of the law.

The new law will also proscribe espionage in China that targets a third country and will punish PRC nationals who while abroad allow themselves to be used by an espionage organization.

Reflections on Jiang Zemin

By Jerome A. Cohen

I have enjoyed the media obituaries and listserv commentaries on Jiang Zemin but hope that there will eventually be appraisals of his contributions to PRC efforts to establish government under law in the post-Tiananmen era. Some very significant criminal justice reforms were adopted when the nation’s Criminal Procedure Law was revised in 1996, and many legislative and regulatory reforms relating to the economy took place in order to make the PRC a plausible candidate for the WTO. Prime Minister Zhu Rongji played a key role regarding the latter, of course, and did recognize the importance of the rule of law to foreign investors. Yet I don’t recall Jiang Zemin saying much of significance about law reform.

I do vaguely recall my disappointment at his reaction to a question about a human rights case that I managed to get someone to ask him at an appearance in Washington. I wanted to bring to his attention - and the public’s - the arbitrary detention of a dissident whose family I was advising. He simply dismissed the question by saying that, since the Public Security Bureau had taken the action, he was sure that the government had reasonable grounds for acting. I would have been wiser to try “the back door” by asking Wang Daohan, whom I knew fairly well and who was thought to be important in promoting Jiang’s rise, to put in a quiet word for my client.

Political Censorship in British Hong Kong

By Jerome A. Cohen

Michael Ng's new book looks like an important contribution to the study of free speech in Hong Kong under British rule; Mr. Ng's upcoming book talk on October 27th will be an interesting program. I wonder whether the establishment of the Universities Service Center by the Carnegie Corporation in Hong Kong in 1963-4 is mentioned in the book. The Hong Kong Government was very slow to give its approval, Carnegie’s representative was very cautious about finalizing arrangements for fear of offending the Brits and ultimately was sacked for being too ineffective.

The HKG was worried about offending the PRC and suspected that USC was going to be a CIA plant rather than a good faith home for visiting scholars of events in China. Carnegie asked me to take over arrangements for setting up the Center since I was in HK for a year of research, needed a place to work, and was a friend of several higher-ups in the UK administration as well as Lord Lawrence Kadoorie, a leading figure in the business community.

Lucian Pye, also in HK that academic year and already an established China scholar, would have been the obvious choice to lead the Carnegie effort but was deemed too close to the US Government, as he himself agreed. I recall how the seating at a dinner party was arranged so that the HKG’s foreign affairs chief could interrogate me for an evening of apparent sociability. It would be interesting to know whether HKG files reveal any of this.