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in this bill are provisions to cut off all military and economic aid to the Governments of Pakistan and Greece. I would like to take this opportunity to praise both the Foreign Affairs Committee and the House of Representatives for taking positive action toward ending the slaughter in Bengal.

This is in marked contrast to the attitude of the executive branch. In his news conference of August 4, President Nixon called the House's action "counterproductive" adding that "we are not going to engage in public pressure on the Government of West Pakistan." Whatever private pressure the President might be using does not seem to be having very much effect. Every day the media reports new atrocities committed by the Pakistani Army. I have included an article in the New York Times by Mr. Alvin Toffler, author of "Future Shock," who recently returned from a trip to the Indo-Pakistani border. The scene he portrays can only further emphasize the wisdom and necessity of the House's action on Tuesday. I urge the President to reconsider his remarks, and join with the Congress in trying to stop the carnage in East Pakistan.

The article follows:

[From The New York Times, Aug. 5, 1971]

THE RAVAGED PEOPLE OF EAST PAKISTAN

(By Alvin Toffler)

A planetary catastrophe is taking place in Asia, a human disaster so massive that it could bathe the future in blood, not just for Asians, but for those of us in the West as well. Yet the response of the global community has been minimal at best. In the United States, the official response has been worse than minimal and morally numb.

I have just returned from Calcutta and the border of East Pakistan, where I conducted interviews with refugees avalanching into India as a result of the West Pakistan's genocidal attack on them. Since March 25, West Pakistani troops have bombed, burned, looted and murdered the citizens of East Pakistan in what can only be a calculated campaign to decimate them or to drive them out of their villages and over the border into India.

Part of the time I traveled with a Canadian parliamentary delegation. We saw babies skin stretched tight, bones protruding, weeping women who told us they would rather die today in India than return to East Pakistan after the tragedies they had witnessed, total wretchedness of refuge camps, and the unbelievable magnitude of this forced human migration—6.7 million refugees pouring into India within a matter of four months.

I saw Indian villages deluged by masses of destitute refugees, every available inch crammed with bodies seeking shelter from the blistering sun and the torrential rain. I saw refugees still streaming along the roads unable to find even a resting place. I saw miserable Indian villagers sharing their meager food with the latest frightened and hungry arrivals. I saw thousands of men, women and babies lined up, waiting patiently under the sun for hours to get their rations. These pitiful few ounces of rice, wheat and dahl provide a level of nutrition so low that it will inevitably create protein breakdown, liver illness, and a variety of other diseases in addition to the cholera, pneumonia, bronchitis that are already rampant. I saw Indian relief officials struggling heroically, and with immense personal sympathy, to cope with the human tidal wave—and to do so on a budget of one rupee a day—about 13 cents per human.

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It is now clear that famine will further devastate East Pakistan this fall, and that millions more will seek refuge in an India already staggering under the burden.

Under these circumstances, one is forced to protest the callousness and stupidity of American policy. On the one hand we promise India \$70 million in relief funds. On the other, we continue to supply arms to the same West Pakistani generals who launched the bloodbath, so that they can terrorize even more of their subjects into fleeing across the Indian border. The House vote this week to suspend aid, including military sales, to Pakistan is belated recognition of our sorry role.

In terms of *realpolitik*, the continuation of military aid to West Pakistan is supposed to buy us influence with the ruling junta, and help offset Red Chinese influence. (Ironically, the Red Chinese are also aiding the West Pakistani generals.)

Yet the heaviest stream of refugees is pouring into West Bengal, which is not only India's poorest and most over-crowded state, but the most politically unstable. Between Calcutta and Bongaon on the border, some 50 miles distant, I saw scarcely a house that didn't have a hammer and sickle painted on it. Maoists, anarchists, and conventional Marxists attack each other and the less radical parties with violence as well as rhetoric. Strikes, demonstrations, and political assassinations are already a daily occurrence. West Bengal, even before the invasion of refugees, seemed about to explode.

By shipping arms to the West Pakistanis, we are partially responsible for pouring millions of hungry, sick and angry refugees directly into this tinderbox. This vastly increases the likelihood of a bloody upheaval on the Indian side of the border as well, in which the power of Maoist movements could only grow. Thus, even if one unquestioningly assumes the necessity to halt the spread of Chinese Communist influence, our policy seems idiotic. We hang on to the shreds of influence in West Pakistan at the cost of losing it in India. Worse, we pave the way for a bigger, bloodier and even more bitter Vietnam in Asia.

But there is a simpler, less political reason why our aid policy must be changed. On grounds of simple humanity, the failure of our Government to express official concern for the ravaged people of East Pakistan, its alliance with the undemocratic generals of Islamabad, and its cruel insistence on sending still more arms to the killers, is morally repulsive.

The emergency in East Pakistan demands a more than minimal response. We need to pump immediate life-saving baby food, powdered milk, antibiotics, anticholera vaccines and similar supplies into India. But beyond that, decency and political realism both demand an immediate end to the arms shipments.

### COMMUNIST CHINA POLICY

HON. JOHN ROUSSELOT

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 6, 1971

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Speaker, the recent official reversal of our policy toward Communist China is a matter of grave concern to me. The following memorandum, which is dated November 6, 1968, and was first reprinted in "Tactics" on February 20, 1969, clearly outlines the steps to be taken to "balance" our relations with this Communist dictatorship. The memorandum is addressed to

"President-Elect Nixon," and it is my understanding that Dr. Henry Kissinger personally delivered this memorandum to Mr. Nixon, just after his election to the Presidency in 1968.

I urge my colleagues to carefully study this document. The effect it has obviously had on our policy toward Communist China is startling. Dr. Kissinger's "advice" so closely parallels the position taken in this memorandum that I cannot overemphasize how important it is that each Member realize that as early as November 6, 1968, at a time when we were most deeply committed in Vietnam, the plan which is being followed today to appease Communist Chinese aggressors was being presented to the President:

MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON ON  
U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA

(The signatories: Jerome Alan Cohen, professor of law, Harvard, chairman; John K. Fairbank, director, East Asian Research Center, Roy Hofheinz, assistant professor of government, Dwight Perkins, professor of economics, Edwin O. Reischauer, professor, Benjamin I. Schwartz, professor of history and government, James Thomson, assistant professor of history, Ezra Vogel, professor of social relations, all of Harvard; A. Doak Barnett, professor of government, Columbia, and Lucian Pye, professor of government, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.) (Except for one professor each from Columbia and M.I.T., they are all from Harvard. The J. F. Kennedy School of Government put it across.)

NOVEMBER 6, 1968.

As scholars in the field of East Asian studies who have completed a year of private discussion of America's relations with East Asia under the auspices of the Institute of Politics of Harvard's J. F. Kennedy School of Government, we write to give you our thoughts on the pivotal issue of United States relations with China.

#### UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

The past two decades of American-East Asian relations has been dominated by the central reality of Sino-American hostility and deadlock. It seems evident that, whatever the nature or timing of a Viet Nam settlement, the China problem will continue to dominate our East Asian relations in the years of the new Administration and, indeed, through the decade of the 1970s.

Communist China's size, ideology, relative isolation, potential power and current internal upheaval increase the dangers of instability in a chronically unstable part of the world. The central objective of America's China policy has been and should continue to be to avoid war with China and to minimize its disruption of surrounding areas.

Since the end of the Korean War, previous Administrations have generally followed a twofold policy to achieve these objectives: On the one hand, military containment in order to deter possible effort at communication with the China mainland through ambassadorial talks and, from time to time, proposals for unofficial contacts. Through much of this period, of course, the first of these approaches has been given such priority as to dwarf the significance of the second.

It seems to us that the time has come for a more equal balance between these two approaches, so that, while continuing to avoid war with China and to discourage Chinese military intervention abroad, we move more positively toward the relaxation of tensions between China and the United States, and the eventual achievement of reconciliation.

The specific steps we propose below in pursuit of these objectives require some important words of caution. Although the outcome of the domestic turmoil that has dis-

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rupted mainland China for the past three years remains unclear, we do not now anticipate any Chinese desire to improve relations with the United States. It is therefore highly likely that any and all of the initiatives that we propose will be rejected out of hand by Peking's leaders in the foreseeable future.

We propose these initiatives, nonetheless, because of our conviction that our national interests in Asia will best be served by an American policy that offers the Chinese the clear option of a less hostile relationship with the outside world. At a minimum, we will complicate a Peking decision-making process that has all too easily been based on a theory of implacable American hostility; at the same time, we will be speaking—through our deeds as well as our words—to present or future Chinese leaders who harbor doubts about Mao Tse-tung's vision of the world. Unless we achieve this better balanced policy, we may at the least miss significant opportunities to moderate Peking's behavior and, at the worst, may help lay the groundwork for a war with China that neither side can hope to "win."

#### PROPOSALS: A. RELATIONS WITH MAINLAND CHINA

1. *Exploratory Meeting.* You should seriously explore the possibility of arranging confidential—perhaps even deniable—conversations between Chinese Communist leaders and someone in whom you have confidence. Your emissary would convey the new Administration's interest in hearing Chinese views on a wide spectrum of subjects including Viet Nam and disarmament and in probing, unofficially and in a more informal setting than at Warsaw, the prospects for a normal relationship. It may well be that the Chinese will refuse to receive such an emissary; the effort should nonetheless be made to signal a revised American attitude.

2. *Viet Nam Negotiations.* The arduous process of a Viet Nam settlement may well offer an opportunity for the improvement of relations with China and engagement of China in the international order. Despite China's present hostility to a negotiated solution, the new Administration should be alert to opportunities to involve Peking in some state of the Viet Nam negotiating process—perhaps through a reconstructed forum, perhaps through a packaged end-product that would bring China, both Viet Nams, and other divided nations into United Nations. The chief consideration: Viet Nam negotiations should be looked upon as a possible step toward a wider Asian settlement, and thereby an instrument for the potential inclusion of China in the international community.

3. *Lowering of Polemics.* It is essential that all Administration spokesmen refrain from provocative statements in their comments about China, regardless of Peking's hostile rhetoric. In the past, pious hopes for "reconciliation" have often been undermined by press releases such as those that compared the Chinese Communists to the Nazis. Especially galling to the Chinese Communists is the apparent American stand that Taiwan is the only China. The new Administration should find an early opportunity to erase this lag between rhetoric and reality. Since 1955, under two parties and three Presidents, the United States Government has dealt, in Geneva and Warsaw and in Taipei, with two regimes that call themselves "China". It would be most useful for you or your Secretary of State to find an occasion to take note of the fact—without fanfare—that we have in effect accorded Peking de facto recognition for a decade and a half, but that de jure recognition is obviously a far more complicated matter that remains to be discussed.

4. *Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM).* The new

Administration will have to decide whether to continue with the recently authorized "thin" ABM system. In our view, insufficient consideration has been given by the present Administration to the consequences for Sino-American relations that this system may entail. Aside from the questions of the Soviet-American military balance, plans for an ABM are not only militarily unnecessary as a deterrent to Peking but may well be viewed by the Chinese Communists as evidence of American intent to attack Peking. We urge that the ABM decision be reconsidered.

5. *Trade.* The new Administration should seek an early opportunity to modify America's trade embargo against China, a residue of the Korean War which denies China nothing she needs, is supported by none of our major allies, acts as periodic irritant in our relations with third parties, denies America even the possibility of marginal economic leverage in changing China, and prevents our businessmen from sharing in the China market. In this regard, the new Administration should build on the tentative rhetoric of its predecessors and place our trade with China on the same basis (non-strategic goods) as our trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe.

6. *Travel and Other Contacts.* The new Administration should likewise remove the last vestiges of control on the travel of Americans to China and, at the same time, should make known its willingness to admit as visitors to the U.S. any Chinese the Peking government is willing to send to our shores. These steps will not only reflect the confidence and strength of a free society; they will open the door to the possibility of de-isolation when some future Chinese leadership is ready to choose that option. In addition to official contacts, the new Administration should encourage private and unofficial meetings, between Chinese and American journalists, educators, scientists, artists, and others.

#### B. RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN

The foregoing steps involve preliminary attempts to restructure the Washington-Peking relationship. Simultaneous with such steps should come, inevitably, a restructuring of the Washington-Taipei relationship. Here again the aim should be to bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality. The United States recognizes the Chinese Nationalists as the Government of the Republic of China, purporting to rule the mainland as well as Taiwan and the Pescadores; but Washington has long since begun to treat them as a government restricted to Taiwan and the Pescadores, tacitly accepting the fact that the Nationalists will not reconquer the mainland. Ever since 1951 every Administration has made it clear that Taiwan is not legally part of China, leaving the question of its status open to future developments. The new Administration should now build upon this reality. It should reaffirm America's commitment to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, so long as people in Taiwan wish to retain a separate identity from mainland China. But by taking four particular steps it should anticipate and defuse Chinese Nationalist potential for causing Washington embarrassment.

1. Your Administration should send as Ambassador to Taiwan a man who understands the Administration's broad China strategy and can communicate it. In order to demonstrate the importance that you attach to political rather than military considerations, he should not be a military man.

2. As long as relative peace prevails in the Formosa Strait, the Administration should use this opportunity to press anew for orderly Nationalist evacuation of the offshore islands, Matsu and Quemoy. (While occupied by the Nationalists, these islands provide a lever by which either "China" can draw American forces into an unwanted Asia con-

flict. It should also press for an end to provocative Nationalist acts against the mainland.

3. The Administration should prepare the ground, in frank discussions with the Chinese Nationalists, for a gradual shift in America's relationship with Peking and, specifically, for the complex problems which will undoubtedly arise in the United Nations. (See below.)

4. Finally, the Administration should be alert to political forces that are at work beneath the surface in Taiwan and, when opportunity offers, should press Chiang Kai-shek and/or his successors to offer the 11,000,000 Taiwanese and the 2,000,000 mainlanders on the island an opportunity for fuller participation in political life.

#### C. BROADER PROBLEMS

1. *The United Nations.* The problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations will probably not confront the new Administration until the autumn of 1969. By that time the search for a Viet Nam settlement as well as earlier China-related initiatives may have tested the prospects for normalization of relations. In the unlikely event that these previous steps have borne fruit in our relations with China, the U.N. situation would present a similar problem. If not, however, it is nonetheless our conviction that the Administration should not seek to block the PRC's representation in the United Nations. For several obvious reasons, UN representation in Peking will undoubtedly come before—and is probably a prerequisite to—improved relations between China and America. In our view, the deisolation of China requires Chinese participation, whenever possible, in international forums and the long-term "socialization" that such contacts may produce. U.S. policy-makers should therefore accept Peking's membership in the General Assembly and the Security Council while seeking simultaneously to preserve a General Assembly seat for Taiwan, whether as the Republic of China, an independent nation, or an autonomous region of China. Such objectives may best be achieved through acquiescence rather than active leadership by Washington; but they will require careful advance planning.

2. *China's Neighbors.* A gradual shift in our China policy, while welcome to our major allies, will cause anxiety among some of China's neighbors who have tailored their actions to the containment aspect of our policy. It is imperative that we ease the transition for these states by keeping them informed of our progress and plans and by assuring them of our continuing interest in their welfare.

3. *Japan.* It is especially important that we take Japan into our confidence in every step of our strategy. Although Japan will favor the substance of our strategy, if we abruptly shift gears without prior notice, we will create acute embarrassment for the Japanese Government.

4. *Third Country Contacts.* We should welcome the efforts of countries such as Japan to develop increasing contacts with mainland China, in the hope of involving the Chinese Communist regime more substantially in the world community.

5. *Washington-Moscow-Peking.* Implicit in the foregoing suggestions is the hope that the new Administration will attempt to view Sino-American relations as a separate problem from Soviet-American relations, though inevitably a related problem. The Sino-Soviet split provides us with an opportunity to treat each party separately and to scrutinize our national interests in each relationship with care. We urge that the new Administration, in its proper concern with the bilateral super-power balance, avoid judgments about China and its development that derive from Moscow's views of Peking. A Soviet-American alliance against Peking may serve

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Russia's interests; but it may not automatically serve U.S. national interests.

We believe that the recommendations outlined above will establish an American posture of firmness in our declared purposes and yet of reasonableness, prudence and willingness to resolve political problems by going halfway to meet the other side. This is a posture that will command the support of the broad center of the American electorate and of most of the nations of the world.

**MEMBERS SHOULD BE FOREWARNED OF SCHEDULED CHANGES IN FOOD STAMP PROGRAM UNDER NEW LAW**

**HON. LEONOR K. SULLIVAN**

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 6, 1971

Mrs SULLIVAN. Mr. Speaker, as the Members of Congress get ready to take a summer recess at the end of this week, they should be prepared for some of the criticisms they are bound to hear back home from those who are already familiar with the changes in the food stamp program scheduled to take effect sometime between now and early next year. Once the changes do go into effect, I am sure the complaints will rise in intensity and bitterness. For Congress passed, in my opinion, a very bad law, whose shortcomings have been largely obscured by the much-publicized, but short-sighted "liberalization" in the act to provide free food stamps for the very poorest families.

A comparatively few families earning less than \$30 a month and now paying \$2 a month for \$106 worth of food—these are figures for a family of four persons—would, under the new law, receive \$108 worth of food stamps a month absolutely free. Any eligible families of 10 persons with incomes of less than \$30, who now pay \$3 a month for more than \$200 worth of food stamps, would receive them free. This is the great so-called liberalization of the program, and the basis on which the changes were hailed as "feeding the hungry."

Actually, millions of persons now receiving food stamps would be cut off the program entirely. Although their incomes may be too low in relation to the cost of living in New York or Pennsylvania or other industrial States to afford an adequate diet, those same incomes would be considered too high for eligibility in Mississippi, and the new law requires uniformity of standards of eligibility throughout the country. Perhaps 2 million persons will be denied continued participation in the food stamp program in the industrialized areas because their incomes are "too high"—even though not sufficient to afford an adequate diet in their own cities or towns. Other millions will find it completely uneconomic to continue to participate. For instance, a family of four with what would now become the maximum eligible income of \$360 a month would have to pay \$99 for \$108 worth of food stamps. Considering the necessary redtape, the tieup of such a high percentage of the family income in food, the required registration for work

at \$1.30 an hour, et cetera, it is obvious that many in what are now to be the upper levels of income eligibility will quit the program as not worth the trouble.

So the Members should be forewarned of the complaints they will be receiving from constituents who have benefited from the food stamp program up to now, but who will be cut off, or discouraged from participating, under the new regulations, particularly in the industrialized states.

**THE 1970 AMENDMENTS SHOULD BE REPEALED**

Mr. Speaker, as many of the Members know, I initiated the legislation which resulted in the Food Stamp Acts of 1959, 1964, 1967, and 1968, but I strongly opposed the 1970 amendments, and I have introduced legislation in this Congress to repeal the 1970 changes. I have also proposed a change in the House rules to remove jurisdiction over food stamp legislation from the Committee on Agriculture, which has largely been hostile to the whole idea of a food stamp program since I first proposed it in 1954, and transfer this jurisdiction to the Committee on Banking and Currency, which is prepared to consider such legislation sympathetically. Banking and Currency initiated the rent supplement program, the homeownership interest rate subsidy program, programs of assured access to household and crime insurance, and most of its members believe in helping the poor to improve their standards of living through self-help and intelligent assistance. The food stamps are, in effect, currency—redeemable at par through the Federal Reserve system. The Committee on Agriculture has, in its handling of food stamp legislation over the years, demonstrated that it has no real interest in the program, resents the use of Agriculture Department funds to finance it, and believes it should properly be handled by some other committee if it is to be continued at all, and actually, it would just as soon see it die.

**KEEPING THE RECORD STRAIGHT**

In any event, Mr. Speaker, in addition to forewarning the Members on the eve of a summer vacation of the political chickens which may come home to roost when low-income constituents begin to understand what the Congress did to them last year in the Food Stamp Act, I want to share with those Members who joined me in opposing the 1970 amendments a letter I wrote to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch disassociating myself from aspects of the 1970 amendments which that outstanding newspaper had criticized in a recent editorial.

Unfortunately, the editorial attributed all of the actions of the Congress last year on the food stamp bill to an attitude I was expressing on the very minor issue of free stamps.

Where or not my colleagues agree with me on the free stamp issue—and I know some of them do not—I am sure they will be interested in seeing my reaction to the Post-Dispatch editorial.

Hence, Mr. Speaker, I submit, as part of my remarks, the editorial from the Post-Dispatch of July 25, entitled "Assistance or Uplift?" my response in the form of a letter to the editor and, follow-

ing that, news articles from both the Post-Dispatch and the St. Louis Globe-Democrat. Both newspapers had supported the idea of a food stamp program over many years.

The material referred to follows:

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 25, 1971]

**ASSISTANCE OR UPLIFT?**

While the new federal food stamp regulations unquestionably contain a number of improvements over the old, it is difficult to imagine how either Congress or the Administration can take much price in revisions that reduce stamp benefits to 2,000,000 needy persons and eliminate them completely for some 65,000 others. Much of the problem, it seems to us, is that the nation has never been able to decide whether the food stamp program should serve as a means of assisting the hungry or as an exercise in moral uplift.

We cannot otherwise explain the remarks of the usually enlightened Representative Leonor K. Sullivan that "what we give away free is not recognized with the appreciation that a person has if he has to sacrifice a bit." Appreciation should have nothing to do with food stamps; the criterion ought to be need, regardless of whether the recipient is grateful, ungrateful, lives in a commune with hippies or beats his wife every Saturday night. The personal habits of the rich, after all, are never at issue when Congress establishes tax breaks for the oil industry or when the President proposes to bail out a giant corporation that has been a model of mismanagement.

It is all to the good that the new rules will add a net total of 2,000,000 to the program by next year. That addition, however, could and should have been accomplished without reducing or eliminating benefits to current recipients; and the improvements should have been possible without the vindictive provisions to deny stamps to students or communards. A genuinely impoverished youth struggling through college should be entitled to stamps; an affluent student who feigns poverty plainly should not be. A truly concerned Government could have devised regulations that would get stamps where they are needed while also preventing them from being abused by those who can afford to purchase food at market prices.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
Washington, D.C., July 29, 1971.

Mr. GEORGE HALL,  
Editor, Editorial Page, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, St. Louis, Mo.

DEAR Mr. HALL: The St. Louis Post-Dispatch was, I believe, the very first newspaper in the Nation to voice editorial support for the food stamp bill I introduced originally in Congress during the 1954 recession to assure better diets for needy Americans unable to afford to purchase sufficient food. This was at a time when we were spending billions of dollars to remove surplus agricultural commodities from the market, and spending a million dollars a day (later a billion dollars a year) to store such food until it could be given away abroad, or sold abroad at sharply reduced prices, or until it rotted away and had to be destroyed or used for cut-rate animal feed.

The Post-Dispatch's support for food stamp legislation was unwavering and vigorous during all of the long and bitter legislative battles which led to the enactment of my bill in 1959, the start of a pilot food stamp program in 1961 by President Kennedy (after President Eisenhower had refused to implement the 1959 Act), the addition of St. Louis to the pilot projects in 1963, and the eventual enactment of a much broader bill which I introduced for the Johnson Administration in 1964 under which millions of