December Was a Bad Month: We Lost Three Important Senior Figures in East Asian-American Relations

By Jerome A. Cohen

Clockwise from Left: Minoru Makihara, Takashi Oka, and Ezra Vogel

Clockwise from Left: Minoru Makihara, Takashi Oka, and Ezra Vogel

One was the distinguished scholar Ezra Vogel of Harvard, about whom I wrote last week. Another was the respected journalist Takashi Oka of the Christian Scientist Monitor and, for some years, The New York Times. The third was the dynamic international business leader Minoru Makihara of the Mitsubishi Corporation. The Times and many other papers carried individual extensive obituaries about each one. I was fortunate to know and admire all three. 

Ezra, as so many have now agreed, was the model American scholar of East Asia. He was one of that rare breed who could actually do research in both Chinese and Japanese sources and conduct interviews in both languages. His many books have made significant contributions to our understanding of each country’s modern development, and his recent published volume on Sino-Japanese interactions from the beginnings of civilization is an ambitious, innovative and highly readable study that provides invaluable background for the complex, intermittent negotiations again under way. Ezra will also never be forgotten by the generations of students and younger scholars whom he so generously nurtured.

Ezra, I and our spouses knew Takashi Oka and his charming wife Hiro from the year 1963-64 we each spent in colonial Hong Kong on our separate research projects interviewing refugees from the China Mainland from which Americans were then still banned. Tak was covering Mao’s China and proved an informed, balanced, insightful and helpful friend. He had a sense of equanimity as well as humor that made it a joy to share his company. The Okas produced two beautiful girls who became talented young women and eventually friends of the three sons whom Joan and I spawned. I recall seeing the whole family eight years later when our family spent the year in Japan and Tak was based in Tokyo as Times Bureau chief, and the Okas, who had many links to Harvard, overlapped with us again in Cambridge during my tenure at the Law School.

I had a closer friendship with “Ben” Makihara, whose career, like Tak’s, embodied the best aspects of the post-World War II US-Japan relationship. Ben’s upbringing and education in the UK, Japan and the US had given him the perfect background for the international roles he was to play. He had many attributes similar to those of Tak and could be extremely lively on occasion. I will never forget the motorcycle ride he insisted I share with him in the early ‘80s to facilitate his introduction of some little-known Tokyo areas. Never having been on a motorcycle before, I was scared stiff, but Ben proved a reliable guide.

Always a loyal Harvard grad, Ben was supportive of the Mitsubishi Group’s establishment of a chair in Japanese law at Harvard Law School.  Like the Okas, Ben and his able wife Kikuko, great-granddaughter of the Mitsubishi Group’s founder, had two talented children. I got to know their son Jun better than their daughter Kumiko because he proved to be a top student at the Harvard Law School while I was still teaching there, and it occurred to me that he would make an excellent and most appropriate first occupant of the Mitsubishi professorship in Japanese law. But Jun decided that he preferred an investment banking career with Goldman Sachs and then others in New York instead of either perpetuating the family tradition at Mitsubishi or embarking on an academic career in comparative law.

Interestingly, the Okas and the Makiharas became linked through the marriage of Mimi Oka to Jun, and the illustrious young couple and their own family have made a much-admired contribution to New York life. Early this month, however, both Tak and Ben passed away within eleven days of each other, and Ezra followed last week. Sic Transit Gloria! Without this extraordinary trio of wonderful human beings East Asian-American relations will be more challenging than ever.

Chinese justice and Japan's Carlos Ghosn case

To those familiar with criminal justice in the PRC, the Ghosn case has always been of great interest. The long detention periods allowed the police and prosecution in democratic Japan as well as totalitarian China, of course, ring a bell. So do the restrictions on access to the detained suspect, although Japan does allow a role for defense counsel if the suspect can afford one. But lawyers are not allowed to be present when the suspect is interrogated, and interrogations go on endlessly in the hope of extracting confessions.

From the outset of the Ghosn case, I was also struck by the apparent coordination between the police/prosecution and major local business interests. This is a frequent phenomenon in China. As Hong Kong, Taiwan and ethnic Chinese business people from other jurisdictions have experienced, involvement in a commercial dispute in China with Chinese partners or rivals can result in detention by local Chinese police. Local Public Security Bureau officials sometimes travel to far flung places within the country to detain non-Mainlander businessmen who, fearful of returning to the locus of their business in China for negotiation of a dispute, have erroneously believed that negotiations could be conducted safely on “neutral” turf elsewhere in the country. Once detained, the “suspect” is told that any criminal charges can be made to disappear if he is only reasonable in settling the matter. Many police fail to realize that, even in a Chinese court, promises extracted under coercion should not be legally enforceable. Or at least they and the politically well-connected local business interests that have mobilized the aid of the police realize that these cases rarely reach the courts for one reason or other or that, if they do, the same political influence that mobilized the police can also guarantee judicial cooperation. 

Latest PRC detention of a Japanese national

By Jerome A. Cohen

Here is a good analysis of the latest PRC detention of a Japanese national, Why Did China Detain a Japanese History Professor?. The Japanese history professor, Iwatani Nobu, was invited to Beijing by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for a conference and was then detained for allegedly possessing “illicit material,” which appears to have been old books and journals that he had purchased at a second-hand bookstore in Beijing. He was eventually released in November 2019.

It reminds me of the case of Song Yongyi, the Dickinson College librarian and Cultural Revolution expert, who was detained early in this century in China for collecting “state secrets” that were actually wall posters from the Cultural Revolution that had been publicly posted in China three decades earlier. I served as pro bono counsel in Song's case. Huge American pressure, especially from the academic community, finally led to his freedom after six months of incommunicado secret police detention but before prosecution.

In the Iwatani case, it would be important to interview him about the details of his detention. He cannot have “pleaded guilty,” as the report says, since he was apparently never brought to court. It is not clear what he allegedly “confessed” to. What were the “Illicit activities” – buying old books in a public book store? What form of detention did he receive? Apparently, he was allowed brief consular visits every month or so but what was he permitted to discuss with the consul? I think an earlier report suggested that he never saw a defense lawyer. Was he indicted? Is he, although released, free to be interviewed or does he feel obligated to adhere to a commitment to post-release silence extracted as part of the release bargain? Has the Japanese Government admonished him to keep silent? Did the GOJ assure the PRC that Iwatani would keep quiet for the first year?  These questions come up in the many similar cases involving foreign nationals’ detention in the PRC. 

 

Taiwan-Japanese Relations and a Rock!

By Jerome A. Cohen

Aerial view of Okinotorishima, Japan. (source: 国土交通省関東地方整備局, Japan)

Aerial view of Okinotorishima, Japan. (source: 国土交通省関東地方整備局, Japan)

Taiwan and Japan, despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, have just signed another agreement and four MoUs on commercial and various matters, in the context of closer ties since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in Taiwan in 2016. I wonder what is going on in the quiet negotiations between Taiwan and Japan over the more sensitive Japanese claim that Okinitorishima is entitled to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles and therefore Japan can restrict Taiwan fishermen from large and rich areas.

The 2016 Philippine arbitration award against China could be invoked by Taiwan in support of its opposition to the EEZ claim but it may be impolitic for Taiwan to do so in light of its need for Japan’s support in other matters (additionally, the arbitration award is not legally binding on Taiwan since Taiwan was not allowed to be a party to the arbitration proceeding, and Taiwan has therefore rejected the arbitration award).

Japan and Taiwan will probably try to work out a compromise on this issue before the 2020 presidential election in Taiwan in light of a possible KMT return to power that would oust Tsai’s DPP administration. The KMT administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-16) was openly hostile to Japan on this fishing rights issue. The EEZ claim, giving Japan control over the resources of a huge sea area, has implications that go far beyond fish and is based on tiny islands not much larger than a king-size bed!